Stark vs LiveWire: The Definition of Electric Motorcycle Success and Failure

Two electric motorcycle companies made headlines within weeks of each other, and the contrast could not be sharper.
On Monday morning, Barcelona-based Stark Future announced it has closed a financing round with a total transaction value of more than €150 million at a €1.2 billion pre-money valuation. Highland Europe led, joined by Morgan Stanley Investment Management’s 1GT climate strategy and Axon Partners Group.
The company calls it the largest investment ever made in a European electric motorcycle maker.
On the other side of the Atlantic, LiveWire, the Harley-Davidson spinoff that once promised to sell 100,000 bikes a year, is trading below a dollar. Its latest filing carries a going-concern warning, a Chief Restructuring Officer, and a CEO who has resigned. Delisting from the NYSE is a live risk, not a hypothetical.
It is tempting to read this as either “electric motorcycles work” versus “electric motorcycles don’t.” That read is wrong. Both companies sell premium electric motorcycles. One has built a business and the other has built a story. The difference is worth understanding, because it tells us where the real opportunity sits.
Full Disclosure: I was hired by Highland Europe Capital to assist in some aspects of the Stark investment round. Neither I nor my company Motorcycle Global own any stock or hold any position in either LiveWire or Stark Future.
Join Michael for more motorcycle industry analysis on his SubStack.
LiveWire: A $1.77 Billion Story, 599 Motorcycles

LiveWire’s problem was never the product concept. The LiveWire One and the S2 Del Mar were well reviewed, and the brand holds roughly 80% of U.S. sales in the 50+ kW electric on-road segment. The problem is that the segment they chose to fill was tiny, and the business was financed and forecast as if it were enormous.
When the SPAC deal was announced in December 2021, the investor deck projected 7,236 units in 2023 and 100,961 units in 2026, with nearly $1.8 billion in revenue. Actual 2023 sales were 660 motorcycles. In 2025, Harley guided to 1,000 to 1,500 and LiveWire delivered 653. Through the first three quarters of 2026 the total is 599. That is about 0.6% of the 2026 target, and the year is almost over.
The money followed the same arc. The deal was meant to deliver about $545 million in net proceeds, but investors redeemed nearly $370 million of the SPAC’s $400 million, and Harley’s stake climbed to nearly 90%. Harley has since moved from equity to lending: a $75 million secured term loan, drawn in December 2025 and due in December 2027, and Harley says it will not fund operating losses. Cash stood at $40 million at the end of September, down $43 million this year.
Then came the leadership vacuum. CEO Karim Donnez resigned on October 21. Roy Gallagher of Ankura was installed as Chief Restructuring Officer and principal executive, and a special committee is weighing new financing, a sale, or a restructuring. Earlier exits included founding executive Ryan Morrissey in 2024 and lead independent director John Garcia in 2025.
Headcount, which was 248 at the end of 2023, has reportedly shrunk to about 150.
The stock tells the rest. It has been quoted around $0.66. The NYSE generally expects a $1 average closing price over 30 trading days and allows a cure period when a company falls short, and LiveWire’s own filings list NYSE listing standards as a risk. Delisting would not by itself end the company, but it would make raising equity, which it badly needs, much harder.
Stark Future: Profit First, Big Cheque Second

Stark’s path looks almost boring by comparison, and that is the point. It picked one segment, off-road, where electric has a genuine performance argument: instant torque, superior traction weight, quiet operation, and no clutch or gearbox to manage. It built the VARG around that argument and then built its own 20,000-square-metre factory outside Barcelona to make the bikes and batteries in-house.
It was not flawless. First deliveries were promised for September 2022 and did not ship until April 2023, with customers who ordered later facing waits into 2024. But once the bikes were moving, the numbers compounded. Stark reported its first profitable quarter in Q2 2025, with €47 million in revenue and €4.5 million in EBITDA. Full-year 2025 revenue was €115 million, up 77%. In the first half of 2026, revenue hit €86 million, up 46%, with 8,124 bikes delivered and, for the first time, a positive EBIT.
The company says the VARG EX is now the best-selling enduro motorcycle in the world, with roughly 50% share in Germany. Management says Q1 2026 beat its internal budget and the first-year share target for the road-legal VARG SM was exceeded. These are company-reported, unaudited numbers, and I would treat the claims with a modicum of caution. But the direction is consistent across several quarters, and a hard-nosed lead investor like Highland Europe has presumably seen the books.
The capital story is also different. Stark’s backing came in stages, including €50 million from Eicher Motors, Royal Enfield’s parent, in 2022 at a valuation near €483 million. Total contributions passed €100 million in 2025. Today’s round has a second closing still open to strategic partners, and at least one outlet notes the €150 million is a transaction value rather than all fresh cash. Even so, this is money arriving after profit, not instead of it. Stark now has nearly 500 employees, more than 650 dealers, and a stated plan to move into larger categories and, within three years, toward an IPO.
What Separates The Two?

Segment choice. Stark attacked a market where electric has an obvious advantage and a loyal, tech-curious buyer. LiveWire went after the premium urban road bike, a segment where buyers compare an $18,000 to $20,000 electric motorcycle with a gasoline bike that is cheaper, goes further, and refuels in five minutes. Even a well-engineered product has a hard time winning that argument.
Sequence of capital. Stark raised modest sums early, shipped, and scaled on revenue, then raised the big round from a position of strength. LiveWire raised its largest sum at the beginning, on a valuation built on a forecast, and then spent through it while revenue stayed small. When the SPAC redemptions hit, the plan was already broken. Raising money before proving the model gives you a bigger runway and fewer reasons to be disciplined.
Ownership and independence. Stark’s founder still runs the company, and its investors are partners rather than a parent. LiveWire has always been a subsidiary in spirit, dependent on Harley for manufacturing, services and now debt, while the parent faces its own sales slump and a new CEO’s cost review. When Harley says it will not fund LiveWire’s losses, the company has no one else to turn to.
Forecast honesty. LiveWire’s deck assumed six-figure volume in five years, which required a dealer network, product range and brand reach that did not exist. Stark’s targets are specific and checkable: roughly 3% of the global enduro segment in year one, about 30% in five years, and a full-year revenue forecast of around €150 million that the first half has already moved well toward.
The Opportunity is Real, And it is Conditional

It would be a mistake to take LiveWire’s troubles as a verdict on premium electric motorcycles. Stark’s numbers, if they hold, show riders will pay up for electric when it beats the alternative at something they care about. Stark is selling thousands of bikes a half-year. Meanwhile, LiveWire’s 80% share of the US on-road market proves that dominating a small segment does not necessarily make a viable business.
In the same country, Surron, Talaria, NIU and other Chinese light electric off-road motorcycles are outselling almost every other model, gas or electric.
But the gap between opportunity and outcome comes down to execution and identifying product-market fit. The two companies above show what that looks like in practice:
Pick a segment where electric wins on merit, rather than one where it must win on ideology or incentives.
Prove unit economics before raising big money, and size the plan to the capital you actually have.
Control your manufacturing and your cost curve, because outsourcing the hard parts to a parent or a partner also outsources your margin and your timeline.
Forecast what you can deliver, then deliver it. Credibility is the cheapest capital a company can raise, and the hardest to rebuild.
Keep leadership stable and accountable, especially when the plan hits turbulence.
Stark still has to prove it can repeat the VARG trick in larger categories. Adventure bikes and road machines are crowded, brand-loyal, and far less forgiving than off-road. A €1.2 billion valuation raises the bar, and the company’s own claims should be tested by independent numbers when they arrive. That is the next chapter, and it will be harder than this one.
LiveWire’s chapter may yet have a second act. A buyer, a recapitalisation, or a tighter focus on the Honcho and Dust platforms could give it a leaner footing. But it will have to earn that second chance one motorcycle at a time. Based on Harley-Davidson's recent comments and the apparent lack of confidence among dealers, however, a second act looks unlikely.
The lesson for the industry, and for anyone watching this space as an investor, rider, or competitor, is simple. Electric motorcycles are not the problem and they are not a fad. The business of selling them is just as unforgiving as the business of selling anything else.
Focus, discipline and delivery win. Product-market fit wins. Fantasy forecasts do not.
Ride safe, folks.
Michael Uhlarik is an international award-winning motorcycle designer and product planner, having developed vehicles and strategies for manufacturers, investors and governments on four continents since 1999. Contact him for industry analysis and client services at Motorcycle Global
Advertisement:
















